Abstract. This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topices include: Nash implementability and the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, two-party competition in tournaments, binary agendas and the top cycle, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate the importance of multiple equilibria in gametheoretic models of political institutions.
The two players in this game, who may be called player 1 and player 2, must independently choose one of two possible strategies: to defer (f ) or to grab (g ). If the players i i both grab or both defer then neither player gets anything; but if exactly one player grabs then he 2 gets payoff 6 while the deferential player gets payoff 3.
This game has three equilibria. There is an equilibrium in which player 1 grabs while player 2 defers, giving payoffs (6,3). There is another equilibrium in which player 1 defers while player 2 grabs, giving payoffs (3,6). There is also a symmetric randomized equilibrium in which each player independently randomizes between grabbing, with probability 2/3, and deferring, with probability 1/3. In this randomized equilibrium, the expected payoffs are (2,2), which is worse for both players than either of the nonsymmetric equilibria.
Now think of an island with a large population of individuals. Every morning, these islanders assemble in the center of their island, to talk and watch the sun rise. Then the islanders scatter for the day. During the day, the islanders are randomly matched into pairs who meet at random locations around the island, and each of these matched pairs plays the simple Battle of Sexes game once. This process repeats every day. Each player's objective is to maximize a longrun discounted average of his (or her) sequence of payoffs from these daily Battle of Sexes matches.
One long-run equilibrium of this process is for everyone to play the symmetric randomized equilibrium in his match each day. But rising up from this primitive anarchy, the players could develop cultural expectations which break the symmetry among matched players, so that they will share an understanding of who should grab and who should defer.
One possibility is that the islanders might develop an understanding that each player has a special "ownership" relationship with some region of the island, such that a player is expected to grab whenever he is in the region that he owns. Notice that this system of ownership rights is a self-enforcing equilibrium, because the other player does better by deferring (getting 3 rather than 0) when he expects the "owner" to grab, and so the owner should indeed grab confidently.
But such a system of traditional grabbing rights might fail to cover many matching situations where no one has clear "ownership." To avoid the costly symmetric equilibrium in such cases, other ways of breaking the players' symmetry are needed. A system of leadership can be used to solve this problem.
That is, the islanders might appoint one of their population to serve as a leader, who will announce each morning a set of instructions that specify which one of the two players should grab in each of the daily matches. As long as the leader's instructions are clear and comprehensive, the understanding that every player will obey these instructions is a selfenforcing equilibrium. A player who grabbed when he was instructed to defer would only lower his expected payoff from 3 to 0, given that the other player is expected to follow his instruction to grab here.
To make this system of government work on our island, the islanders only need a shared understanding as to who is the leader. The leader might be the eldest among the islanders, or the tallest, or the one with the loudest voice. Or the islanders might determine their leader by some contest, such as a chess tournament, or by an annual election in which all the islanders vote. Any method of selection that the islanders understand can be used, because everyone wants to obey the selected leader's instructions as long as everyone else is expected to obey him. Thus, selfenforcing rules for a political system can be constructed arbitrarily from the equilibrium selection problem in this game.
The islanders could impose limits to a leader's authority in this political system. For example, there might be one leader whose instructions are obeyed on the northern half of the island, and another leader whose instructions are obeyed on the southern half. The islanders may even have ways to remove a leader, such as when he loses some re-election contest or when he issues instructions that violate some perceived limits. If a former leader tries to make an announcement in his former domain of authority, every player would be expected to ignore this announcement as irrelevant cheap talk.
Of course, the real world is very different from the simple island of this fable. But as in this island, coordination games with multiple equilibria are pervasive in any real society. Thus, any successful society must develop leadership structures that can coordinate people's expectations in situations of multiple equilibria. So the first point of this fable is the basic social need for leadership and for political institutions that can provide it.
The second point of this fable is that the effectiveness of any political institution may be derived simply from a shared understanding that it is in effect, as Hardin (1989) has argued.
Thus, any political system may be one of many possible equilibria of a more fundamental coordination game of constitutional selection. That is, the process of selecting a constitution can 4 be viewed as an equilibrium-selection problem, but it is the equilibrium-selection problem to solve all other equilibrium-selection problems.
The arbitrariness of political structures from this game-theoretic perspective validates our treating them as exogenous explanatory parameters in political economics. A question might be posed, for example, as to whether one form of democracy might generate higher economic welfare than some other forms of government. Such a question would be untestable or even meaningless if the form of government were itself determined by the level of economic welfare.
But our fable suggests that the crucial necessary condition for democracy is not wealth or literacy, but is simply a shared understanding that democracy will function in this society (so that an officer who waves his pistol in the legislative chamber should be perceived as a madman in need of psychiatric treatment, not as the new leader of the country).
A general impossibility theorem
There is an enormous diversity of democratic political institutions that could exist. Social choice theory is a branch of mathematical social science that tries to make general statements about all such institutions. Given the diversity of potential institutions, the power of social choice theory may be quite limited, and indeed its most famous results are negative impossibility theorems. But it is good to start with the general perspective of social choice theory and see what can be said at this level. Later we can turn to formal political theory, where we will focus on narrower models that enable us to say more about the specific kinds of political institutions that exist in the real world.
Modern social choice theory begins with the great theorem of Arrow (1951) . This theorem has led to many other impossibility theorems, notably the theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) . (See also Sen, 1970.) In this section, we focus on the theorem of Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) , because this is the impossibility theorem that applies directly to Nash-equilibrium implementation. The Muller-Satterthwaite theorem was first proven as a consequence of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Arrow theorems, but we prove it here directly, following Moulin (1988) .
Let N denote a given set of individual voters, and let Y denote a given set of alternatives We let L(Y) denote the set of profiles of such preference orderings, one for each N individual voter. We denote such a preference profile by a profile of utility functions u = (u ) ,
where each u is in L(Y). So if the voters' preference profile is u, then the inequality u (x) > u (y)
means that voter i prefers alternative x over alternative y. The assumption of strict preferences implies that either u (x) > u (y) or u (y) > u (x) must hold if x = / y. 
Any social choice correspondence that is constructed as the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of some fixed game form must be monotonic in this sense. (See Maskin, 1985.) To see why, suppose that x is a Nash equilibrium outcome when the preferences are as in u. This means that there is some profile of strategies that the players might use in the game such that x is the outcome, and no player can get an outcome that he strictly prefers (under the preferenceprofile u) by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. Then condition (1) above says that the set of strategies that are better than x for any player is the same or smaller when the preferences change from u to v, and so x must still be an equilibrium outcome under v.
Given any social choice function F: Following Arrow (1951) , let us say that a set of voters T is decisive for an ordered pair of distinct alternatives (x,y) in X×X iff there exists some preference profile u such that
That is, T is decisive for (x,y) iff x can be chosen when the individuals in T all prefer x over y but everyone else prefers y over x. Lemma 1 asserts that if T is decisive for (x,y) then y is never chosen by F when everyone in T prefers x over y.
Lemma 3. Suppose that #X > 2. If the set T is decisive for some pair of distinct alternatives in X×X, then T is decisive for every such pair.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that T is decisive for (x,y), where x 0 X, y 0 X, and x = / y.
Choose any other alternative z such that z 0 X and x = / z = / y.
Consider a preference profile v such that
and v has everyone preferring x, y, and z over all other alternatives. By Lemma 2, F(v) must be in {y,z}, because x and all other alternatives are Pareto dominated (by z). But F(v) cannot be y,
by Lemma 1 and the fact that T is decisive for (x,y). So F(v) = z, and
is also decisive for (z,y).
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Now consider instead a preference profile w such that
and w has everyone preferring x, y, and z over all other alternatives. By Lemma 2, F(w) must be in {x,y}, because z and all other alternatives are Pareto dominated (by y). But F(w) cannot be y,
by Lemma 1 and the fact that T is decisive for (x,y). So F(w) = x, and T = {i* w (x) > w (z)}. So
T is also decisive for (x,z).
So decisiveness for (x,y) implies decisiveness for (x,z) and decisiveness for (z,y). The general statement of Lemma 3 can be derived directly from repeated applications of this fact.
Q.E.D.
To complete the proof of the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem, let T be a set of minimal size among all sets that are decisive for distinct pairs of alternatives in X. Lemma 2 tells us that T cannot be the empty set, so #T = / 0.
Suppose that #T > 1. Select an individual h in T, and select alternatives x, y, and z in X, and let u be a preference profile such that
and everyone prefers x, y, and z over all other alternatives. Decisiveness of T implies that F(u) = / y. If F(u) were x then {h} would be decisive for (x,z), which would contradict minimality of T.
If F(u) were z then T\{h} would be decisive for (z,y), which would also contradict minimality of T. But Lemma 2 implies F(u)0{x,y,z}. This contradiction implies that #T must equal 1.
So there is some individual h such that {h} is a decisive set for all pairs of alternatives.
That is, for any pair (x,y) of distinct alternatives in X, there exists a preference profile u such that This theorem tells us that the only way to design a game that always has a unique Nash equilibrium is to give one individual all the power, or to restrict the possible outcomes to two. In fact, many institutions of government actually fit one of these two categories. Decision-making in the executive branch is often made by a single decision-maker, who may be the president or the minister with responsibility for a given domain of social alternatives. On the other hand, when a vote is called in a legislative assembly, there are usually only two possible outcomes: to approve or to reject some specific proposal that is on the floor. (Of course, the current vote may be just one stage in a longer agenda, as when the assembly considers a proposal to amend another proposal that is to scheduled be considered later.)
But the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem also leaves us another way out. The crucial assumption in the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem is that F is a social choice function, not a multivalued social choice correspondence. Dropping this assumption just means admitting that political processes might be games that sometimes have multiple equilibria. As Schelling (1960) has emphasized, when a game has multiple equilibria, the decisions made by rational players may depend on culture and history (via the focal-point effect) as much as on their individual preferences. So we can use social choice procedures which consider more than two possible outcomes at a time and which are not dictatorial, but only if we allow that these procedures might sometimes have multiple equilibria that leave some decisive role for cultural traditions and other factors that might influence voters' collective expectations.
Anonymity and neutrality
Having a dictatorship as a social choice function is disturbing to us because it is manifestly unfair to the other individuals. But nondictatorship is only the weakest equity requirement. In the theory of democracy, we should aspire to much higher forms of equity than nondictatorship. A natural equity condition is that a social choice function or correspondence should treat all the voters in the same way. In social choice theory, symmetric treatment of voters is called anonymity.
A permutation of any set is a one-to-one function of that set onto itself. Then we say that a social choice function or correspondence F is neutral iff, for every preference profile u and every permutation D:Y 6 Y on the set of alternatives,
Notice that neutrality of a social choice function F implies that its range must include all possible alternatives, that is,
To see the general impossibility of constructing social choice functions that are both anonymous and neutral, it suffices to consider a simple example with three alternatives Y = {a,b,c} and three voters N = {1,2,3}. Consider the preference profile u such that u (a) > u (b) > u (c),
We may call this example the ABC paradox (where "ABC" stands for Arrow, Black, and Condorcet, who drew attention to such examples). An example like this appeared at the heart of the proof of the impossibility theorem in the preceding section. Any alternative in this example can be mapped to any other alternative by a permutation of Y such that an appropriate permutation of N can then return the original preference profile. Thus, an anonymous neutral social choice correspondence must choose either the empty set or the set of all three alternatives for this ABC paradox, and so an anonymous neutral social choice function cannot be defined.
This argument could be also formulated as a statement about implementation by Nash equilibria. Under any voting procedure that treats the voters anonymously and is neutral to the various alternatives, the set of equilibrium outcomes for this example must be symmetric around the three alternatives {a,b,c}. Thus, an anonymous neutral voting game cannot have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium that selects only one out of the three alternatives for the ABC paradox.
This argument does not generalize to randomized-strategy equilibria. The symmetry of this example could be satisfied by a unique equilibrium in randomized strategies such that each alternative is selected with probability 1/3. The Muller-Satterthwaite theorem does not consider randomized social choice functions, but Gibbard (1978) Randomization confronts democratic theory with the same difficulty as multiple equilibria, however. In both cases, the social choice ultimately depends on factors that are unrelated to the individual voters' preferences (private randomizing factors in one case, public focal factors in the other). As Riker (1982) has emphasized, such dependence on extraneous factors implies that the outcome chosen by a democratic process cannot be characterized as a pure expression of the voters' will.
Tournaments and binary agendas
When there are only two alternatives, majority rule is a simple and compelling social choice procedure. K. May (1952) showed that, when #Y = 2 and #N is odd, choosing the This backwards analysis is shown in Figure 1 .2 which displays, in parentheses above each decision node, the ultimate outcome that would be chosen by sophisticated majority voting if the process reached this node.
In general, given any finite set of alternatives Y, a binary agenda on Y is a rooted tree that has two branches coming out of each nonterminal node, together with a labelling that assigns an outcome in Y to every terminal node, such that each alternative in Y appears as the outcome for at least one terminal node. Given a binary agenda, a sophisticated solution extends the labelling to all nodes so that, for every nonterminal node 2, the label at 2 is the alternative in Y that would be chosen by a majority vote among the alternatives listed at the two nodes that directly follow 2. A sophisticated outcome of a binary agenda is the outcome assigned to the initial node (or root) of the agenda tree in a sophisticated solution.
Given any preference profile for an odd number of voters, each binary agenda on Y has a unique sophisticated solution, which can be easily calculated by backward induction. (See Farquharson, 1969, and Sloth, 1993 .) Thus, once a binary agenda has been specified, it is straightforward to predict the outcome that will be chosen under majority rule, assuming that the voters have a sophisticated understanding of each others' preferences and of the agenda.
But different agendas may lead to different majority-rule outcomes for the same voters'
preferences. Thus the chairman who sets the agenda may have substantial power to influence the sophisticated majority-rule outcome. To quantify the extent of such agenda-setting power, we want to characterize the set of alternatives that can be achieved under binary agendas, for any given preference profile.
To compute sophisticated solutions, it is only necessary to know, in each pair of alternatives, which one would be preferred by a majority of the voters. That is, we only need to know, for each pair of distinct alternatives x and y in Y, whether x >> y or y >> x. (Read ">>"
here as "would be preferred by a majority over.")
The ABC paradox shows the majority-preference relation >> is not necessarily transitive, even though each individual voter's preferences are assumed to be transitive. In fact, McGarvey (1953) showed that a relation >> can be generated as the majority-preference relation for an odd number of voters whose individual preferences are transitive if and only if it satisfies the following completeness and antisymmetry condition:
x >> y or y >> x, but not both, oex0Y, oey0Y\{x}.
Any such relation >> on Y may be called a tournament.
The top cycle
Let >> be any fixed tournament (complete and antisymmetric) on the given set of alternatives Y. We now consider three definitions that each characterize a subset of Y.
Let Y*(1) denote the set of all alternatives x such that there exists a binary agenda on Y for which x is the sophisticated outcome. That is, Y*(1) is the set of outcomes that could be achieved by agenda-manipulation, when the agenda-setter can plan any series of binary questions, subject only to the constraint that every alternative in Y must be admitted as a possibility under the agenda, and all questions will be resolved by sophisticated (forwardlooking) majority votes.
Let Y*(2) denote the set of alternatives y such that, for every alternative x in Y\{y}, there must exist some chain (z ,z ,...,z ) such that x = z , z = y, and z << z for every k = 1,...,m.
That is, an alternative y is in Y*(2) iff, starting from any given status quo x, the voters could be manipulated to give up x for y through a sequence of replacements such that, at each stage, the majority would always prefer to give up the previously chosen alternative for the manipulator's proposed replacement if they believed that this replacement would be the last. In contrast to Y*(1) which assumed sophisticated forward-looking voters, Y*(2) is based on an assumption that voters are very naive or myopic.
Let Y*(3) be defined as the smallest (in the set-inclusion sense) nonempty subset of Y that has the following property:
for any pair of alternatives x and y, if y is in the subset and x is not in the subset then y >> x.
An argument is needed to verify that this set Y*(3) is well defined. Notice first that Y is itself a "subset" that has this property (because the property is trivially satisfied if no x outside of the subset can be found). Notice next that, if W and Z are any two subsets that have this property then either W f Z or Z f W. (Otherwise we could find w and z such that w0W, wóZ, z0Z, and zóW; but then we would get w >> z and z >> w, which is impossible in a tournament.) Thus, assuming that Y is finite, there exists a smallest nonempty set Y*(3) that has this property, and which is a subset of all other sets that have this property.
A fundamental result in tournament theory, due to Miller (1977) , is that the above three definitions all characterize the same set Y*. This set Y* is called the top cycle. voters' preferences. R. May (1971) has proven that, if the number of voters is odd and more than 2, then the probability of a Condorcet winner existing among the alternatives in Y goes to zero as #Y goes to infinity. (See also Fishburn, 1973.) McKelvey (1976, 1979) has shown that, under some common assumptions about voters' preferences, if a Condorcet winner does not exist then the top cycle is generally very large. We now state and prove a simple result similar to McKelvey's.
We assume a given finite set of alternatives Y, and a given odd finite set of voters N, each of whom has strict preferences over Y. Let )(Y) denote the set of probability distributions over the set Y. We may identify )(Y) with the set of lotteries or randomized procedures for choosing Proof. If the top cycle is not a single alternative, then the top cycle must include a set of three or more alternatives {w , w , ..., w } such that w << w << .. << w << w .
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory guarantees that every individual who strictly prefers w over w , will also strictly prefer (1-g)q + g[w ] over (1-g)q + g[w ] for any lottery q.
denotes the lottery that gives outcome w with probability g, and otherwise j j implements the outcome randomly selected by lottery q.) Thus, by continuity, there must exist some large integer M such that every individual who strictly prefers w over w , will also j+1 j strictly prefer
1 j for any m between 0 and M-1. That is, the same majority that would vote to change from w to j w would also vote to change from w to w with probability g even when this decision also j+1 j j+1 entails a probability (1-g)/M of changing from w to z.
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We now prove the theorem using the Y*(2) characterization of the top cycle. Because w 1 is in the top cycle, we can construct a naive chain from any alternative x to w (x <<...<< w ).
This naive chain can be continued from w to z as follows:
(for some j). The proof of Theorem 1.3 uses the naive-chain characterization of the top cycle (Y*(2)), but the equivalence theorem tells us that this result also applies to agenda manipulation with sophisticated voters. That is, if the chairman can include randomized social-choice plans among the possible outcomes of an agenda then, either a Condorcet winner exists, or else the chairman can design a binary agenda that selects any arbitrary alternative (even one that may be worst for all voters) with arbitrarily high probability in the majority-rule sophisticated outcome.
If more restrictions are imposed on the form of the agenda that can be used, then the set of alternatives that can be achieved by agenda manipulation may be substantially smaller. For example, Banks (1985) has characterized the set of alternatives that can be achieved as sophisticated outcomes of successive-elimination agendas of the following form: The alternatives must be put into an ordered list; the first question must be whether to eliminate the first or second alternative in this list; and thereafter the next question is always whether to eliminate the previous winner or the next alternative on the list, until all but one of the alternatives have been eliminated. For any given tournament (Y,>>), the set of alternatives that can be sophisticated outcomes of such successive-elimination agendas is called the Banks set.
Given a tournament (Y,>>), an alternative x is covered iff there exists some other alternative y such that y >> x and {z* x >> z} f {z* y >> z}.
If x is Pareto-dominated by some other alternative then x must be covered. The uncovered set is the set of alternatives that are not covered. (See Miller, 1980 .) The uncovered set is always a subset of the top cycle, because any alternative not in Y*(3) is covered by any alternative in Y*(3). On the other hand, the Banks set is always a subset of the uncovered set. (See Shepsle and Weingast, 1984; Banks, 1985; McKelvey, 1986; or Moulin, 1986 .) Thus, Pareto-dominated alternatives cannot be sophisticated outcomes of successive-elimination agendas.
Two-party competition
We have studied binary agendas because they allow us to reduce the problem of choosing among many alternatives to a sequence of votes each of which is binary, in the sense that it has only two possible outcomes. However, the number of binary votes that are needed to work through a large number of alternatives goes up at least as the log (base 2) of the number of alternatives. When we move from voting in small committees to voting in large democratic nations, the increased cost of each round of voting makes it impractical to work through a long sequence of votes. So democracies generally rely on political leaders to select a small subset of the potential social alternatives, and then only this small selected set of social alternatives will be considered by the voters in the general election. The hope for a successful democracy is that competition among political leaders should ensure that they will try to select alternatives that are highly preferred by a large fraction of the voting population.
So let us consider a simple model of how political leaders might select alternatives to put before the voters in a general election. We assume that the set of all possible social alternatives Y is a nonempty finite set. To keep voting binary, we assume here that there are only two political leaders, each of whom must select an alternative in Y, which we may call the leader's policy position. Making the simplest assumption about timing, let us suppose that the two political 20 leaders must choose their policy positions simultaneously and independently.
Let >> denote the majority preference relation, satisfying the completeness and antisymmetry properties of a tournament. We assume that the leader whose policy position is preferred by a majority of the voters will win the election if they choose different positions, and each leader has a probability 1/2 of winning if both leaders choose the same policy position.
Assuming that each leader is motivated only by the desire to win, we get a simple two-person zero-sum game. In this game, when leader 1 chooses position x and leader 2 chooses position The general existence theorems of von Neumann (1928) and Nash (1951) assure us that this game must have at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies, even if a Condorcet winner does not exist. We know that all equilibria must give the same expected payoff allocation, because this game is two-person zero-sum. The ex-ante symmetry of the leaders who are playing this game makes it obvious that each player must have the same set of equilibrium strategies, and the expected payoff allocation in equilibrium must be (0,0). That is, each leader's probability of winning the election must be 1/2 at the beginning of the game (before the randomized strategies are implemented).
For the example of the ABC paradox from Section 1.3, the unique equilibrium strategy for each leader is to randomize uniformly over the three alternatives, choosing each with probability 1/3. Then there is a 1/3 probability of leader 1 choosing a position that beats leader 2's position (in the sense that x >> x ); there is a 1/3 probability of leader 1 choosing a position Remarkably, Fisher and Ryan (1992) showed that there is always a unique equilibrium strategy in this game. Our formulation and proof of this uniqueness theorem here is based on Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) . has a unique Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, every alternative that is a best response is assigned positive probability.
Proof. Let p and q be randomized strategies in )(Y) in two Nash equilibria of this game.
The two players in this game are symmetric, and Nash equilibria of two-person zero-sum games are always interchangeable, and so (p,p), (q,q), and (p,q) must all be Nash equilibria of this game.
Let B = {y0Y* p(y) > 0 or q(y) > 0}.
Because randomizing according to p or q is optimal for a player against p or q, all of the alternatives in B must offer the equilibrium expected payoff against both p and q. But we know that the equilibrium expected payoff is 0 in this game. So choosing any alternative in B must
give a player a probability of winning that equals his probability of losing, when the other player randomizes according to p or q. That is, The components of p must be rational numbers, because p is the unique equilibrium strategy for a two-person zero-sum game that has payoffs in the rational numbers. Now let p* denote the smallest positive multiple of p that has all integer components. This vector p* satisfies 3 p*(x) = 3 p*(x), x<<y x>>y for every pure strategy y that is a best response to the equilibrium strategy p (which includes all y in its support B), because all best responses give expected payoff zero. At least one p*(z) must be odd (or else we could divide them all by 2). So the sum of the components
x<<z is an odd integer. For every y that is a best response to the equilibrium strategy p, we have p*(y) + 2(3 p*(x)) = 3 p*(x), x<<y x0B
and so p*(y) is also an odd integer. But 0 is not odd. Thus, if y is any best response to the equilibrium strategy p then
The set of alternatives that may be chosen with positive probability by the party leaders in the equilibrium of this policy-positioning game is called the bipartisan set of the tournament (Y,>>). The bipartisan set is a subset of the uncovered set, because the covered alternatives are 23 the dominated strategies in this policy-positioning game, and so the bipartisan set is always contained in the top cycle. Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) have shown, however, that the bipartisan set may contain alternatives that are not in the Banks set, and the Banks set may contain alternatives that are not in the bipartisan set.
Median voter theorems
We have seen that, if a Condorcet winner exists, then we can expect it as the outcome of rational voting in any binary agenda, or as the unique policy position that would be chosen by party leaders in two-party competition. But when a Condorcet winner does not exist, then agenda manipulation with randomized alternatives can achieve virtually any outcome, and the outcome of two-party policy positioning must have some unpredictability. So we should be interested in economic conditions that imply the existence of a Condorcet winner in Y. The most natural such condition is expressed by the median voter theorems.
There are two basic versions of the median voter theorem. One version (from Black, 1958 ) assumes single-peaked preferences, and another version (from Gans and Smart, 1994 , Rothstein, 1990 , 1991 , and Roberts, 1977 ) assumes a single-crossing property.
To develop the single-crossing property, we begin by assuming that the policy alternatives in Y are ordered completely and transitively, say from "left" to "right" in some sense.
We may write "x < y" to mean that the alternative x is to the left of alternative y in the space of policy alternatives. We also assume that the voters (or their political preferences) are transitively ordered in some political spectrum, say from "leftist" to "rightist," and we may write "i < j" to mean that voter i is to the left of voter j in this political spectrum.
The meaning of this ordering of voters is only that leftist voters tend to favor left policies more than voters who are rightist in political preference. Formally, we assume that, for any two voters i and j such that i < j, and for any two policy alternatives x and y such that x < y, if u (x) < u (y) then u (x) < u (y),
This assumption is called the single-crossing property.
Let us assume that the number of voters is odd and their ordering is complete and 24 transitive. Then there is some median voter h, such that #{i0N* i < h} = #{j0N* h < j}. For any pair of alternatives x and y such that x < y, if the median voter prefers x then all voters to the left of the median agree with him, but if the median voter prefers y then all voters to the right of the median agree with him. Either way, there is a majority of voters who agree with the median voter. So the majority preference relation (>>) is the same as the preference of the median voter.
Thus, the alternative that is most preferred by the median voter must be a Condorcet winner.
That is, we have proven the following theorem. That is, on either side of 2 , voter i always prefers alternatives that are closer to 2 . This property i i
is called the single-peakedness assumption. Assuming that the number of voters is odd, the median voter's ideal point is the alternative 2* such that #N/2 $ #{i* 2 < 2*} and #N/2 $ {i* 2* < 2 }.
i i
The voters who have ideal points at 2* and to its left form a majority that prefers 2* over any alternative to the right of 2*, while the voters who have ideal points at 2* and to its right form a majority that prefers 2* over any alternative to the left of 2*. Thus, this median voter's ideal point 2* is a Condorcet winner in Y.
Single-crossing and single-peakedness are different assumptions, and neither is logically implied by the other. Both assumptions give us a result that says "the median voter's ideal point is a Condorcet winner," but there is a subtle difference in the meaning of these results. With the single-crossing property we are speaking about the ideal point of the median voter, but with the single-peakedness property we are speaking about the median of the voters' ideal points. Notice 25 also that the majority preference relation can be guaranteed to be a full transitive ordering under the single-crossing assumption, but not under the single-peakedness assumption.
In both versions of the median voter theorem, the set of policy alternatives must be essentially one-dimensional, because otherwise we cannot put the alternatives in a transitive order. In general applications that do not have this simple one-dimensional structure, we do not generally expect to find a Condorcet winner.
Conclusions
We have considered binary agendas and two-party competition, because they are procedures for reducing general social choice problems with many alternatives into a simple framework of majority voting on pairs of alternatives. This reduction requires some decisionmaking by political leaders: the chairman who sets the agenda, or the leaders who formulate policy for the two major parties. So it is natural ask, to what extent do the outcomes of binary agendas or two-party competition depend on the decision-making by such political leaders, rather than on the preferences of the voters. The answer, we have seen, is that manipulations of an agenda-setter or arbitrary and unpredictable positioning decisions of political leaders can substantially affect the outcome of majority voting, except in the special case where a Condorcet winner happens to exist.
To find ways of avoiding such dependence on an agenda setter or a couple of party leaders, we must go on to study more general voting systems that allow voters to consider more than two alternatives at once. K. May's theorem (1952) assured us that majority rule is the unique obvious way to implement the principles of democracy (anonymity, neutrality) in social decision-making when only two alternatives are considered at a time. In contrast, there is a wide variety of anonymous neutral voting systems that have been proposed for choosing among more than two alternatives (plurality voting, Borda voting, approval voting, single transferable vote, etc.), and all of these deserve to be called democratic. Furthermore, the impossibility theorems of social choice theory tell us that no such voting system can guarantee a unique pure-strategy equilibrum for all profiles of voters' preferences. Multiplicity of equilibria means that the social outcome can depend on any factor that focuses public attention on one equilibrium. These focal 26 factors may include history, cultural tradition, and public speeches of political leaders. (See Schelling, 1960, and Myerson and Weber, 1993.) Our initial fable suggested that political institutions may arise out of a need to coordinate on better equilibria in social and economic arenas, and we have found that some of this multiplicity of equilibria may inevitably remain in any democratic political system. But having multiple equilibrium outcomes for some preference profiles does not imply that everything must be an equilibrium outcome for all preference profiles. Game-theoretic analysis of political institutions can show substantial differences in the equilibrium outcomes under different political institutions. If social choice theory has not given us one perfect voting system, then it has left us the important task of characterizing the properties and performance of the many voting systems that we do have.
